Capital Structure of Owner- and Management- operated Companies: An Empirical Study on the Example of TecDax-Companies
[1]
Martin Kaschny, Business Sciences, University of Applied Sciences Koblenz, Koblenz, Germany.
[2]
Kay Mueller, Business Sciences, University of Applied Sciences Koblenz, Koblenz, Germany.
The objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure by looking at 30 Tec-Dax-companies. One crucial aspect is the potential impact that the capital structure may have on corporate success. In particular, we are investigating whether owner-run businesses are more successful than those run by managers. In conclusion, it can be stated that there is a curvilinear relationship between management ownership and debt ratio. Furthermore, the results play a key role in stimulating the capital structure debate and allow a better understanding of the differences in the capital structure and their impact.
Capital Structure, Debt rate, Empirical Study, Management-operated, Owner-operated, Shareholder Structure, TecDax
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