

# Democracy, Economy and Its Effects on the Mexican Political System

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## Abstract

Democracy in the Mexican political system occurred as a gradual process of opening since 1977. The transition was made in all areas of government (municipal, state and federal). Mexico is characterized by following a path of consolidation of its institutions. The arrival of another party presidential power generated outstanding tasks like divided government. From the above there have been various proposals to revitalize the constitutional engineering of the Mexican regime. The PRI has returned to the presidency and achieved important reforms initially approved by the Mexico Pact.

## Keywords

Alternation, Governance, Congress Divided Governments, Political Parties

## 1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to analyze the path of democracy in the Mexican political system, its progress, institutional challenges and real limitations in the scheme. The first part is a brief meaning of the values of democracy as an ideal government. In the second part, an analysis of political change is made. Finally reflect on constitutional re-engineering: the necessary changes.

Democracy is one of the many forms of government according to the classification of political science (dictatorship, authoritarianism, democracy) however this is the most widespread worldwide [18]. While the historic enemy of democracy was defeated with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Socialist opponents now faces into the political system. The main problems are focused on constitutional engineering design, which throws in presidential systems problems, which are exacerbated by divided governments.

In the world there are ideological opponents of democracy, as in the case of China and India, the first as an authoritarian-dominant and the second with a quasi-democracy weak, although there are also cases of the East region that test responsiveness of democracy. In some

regions are still disputing the arrival of democracy, while others faced with internal problems, such as poor governance, poor quality of democracy, while in others such as Mexico the difficulty is because the President is a party, and the majority party in the Congress of another, this happened so until 2012, but with the return of the PRI to the presidency remains the same problem: no qualified majority government.

In the types of governance regimes, the Mexican political system was a special case for the creation and adaptation of a hegemonic party system [34]. This system was in force for decades until the process of alternation of July 2, 2000. There are important works that explain the transition to democracy from a gradualist perspective, including Mauricio Merino [27], Alonso Lujambio [24], Meyer [29], Loaeza [23], Espinoza y Meyenberg, [14] and numerous other work that emerged after the historic result.

The transition process presented a moderate pluralism system-exclusive three big parties, which persisted until 2012 [14]. At present there is no question the ability of alternating political system rather settles a dispute over the new challenges of governance, dialogue and consensus that produce divided governments. This problem has been present in the last two presidential administrations PAN, Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon. The winner of the elections of July 1,

2012 is facing the same problem, do not have the majority by itself to constitutional reforms, although the Mexico Pact signed between the PRI, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the National Action Party (PAN) has managed to pass major reforms in Congress.

Lack of dynamic balance between the executive and Congress Launches New Challenges in the constitutional design. This shows that the political system needs to change. This article offers suggestions to enrich the debate on the Mexican political system adaptation to a new socio-political reality. The following sections will briefly the basic features of democracy, which will be oriented to the Mexican case.

## 2. Essential Characteristics of Democracy

To outline democracy in Mexico is pertinent to the basic meaning of its core values and evaluate the performance of democracy in Mexico from 2000 to 2012. The reflection adds to the large body of work that explained from theoretical and empirical levels the subject, however this article provides a current assessment of the challenges for the Mexican case.

### 2.1. The Characteristics of Democracy

The theory of democracy in authors such as Giovanni Sartori [34 y 35], Robert Dahl [8], Norberto Bobbio [5], Alan Touraine [39] and Arend Lijphart [21] note the following basic characteristics:

- a. It is one of several forms of government, although there are others such as the military dictatorship, the Arab regime and totalitarianism.
- b. It is the most widespread form of government in the world today.
- c. Ensures more rights and freedoms that assume the state to the citizen.
- d. Democracy ensures a set of symbolic and material values than any other form of government can provide citizens:

*Table 1. The Characteristics Of Democracy.*

Citizens	Government
Political Participation	Pluralism (peaceful coexistence of the ideological spectrum-left, center, right)
Inclusion in public decisions	Existence of different political parties
Ability to gain power	Ability to alternation at all levels of government: local, state and presidential.
Tolerance and liberal thinking	

The Mexican political system since at least the 1970s onwards began a gradual opening and recognized fundamental rights of political participation. Opposition political organizations won legislative seats in places and from the 1990s in electoral institutions. The possibility of gaining power was reflected first in the spaces closest to the citizens, is municipalities, and after the opposition won states in Mexico and finally the PRI was defeated in 2000. The PAN ruled for 12 years the presidency.

Democracy has given way to political change again, and

based on the result of the July 1, 2012, the PRI presidential power has returned. The PRD reached a significant number of seats in Congress, similar to 2006, when he won 127 MPs. In 2012 achieved almost 140 in conjunction with the Labor Party and Citizens Movement. The PAN practically turned the losing party to go to third in the voting preferences and significantly reduce its presence in the Congress won 143 MPs in 2009 and in 2012 won a little over 100 seats. In the Senate in 2006 obtained 50 seats, and 2012 was reduced to 41 seats.

The essence of democracy is the ability to include as many people in public affairs, both in the design and decision making [36]. Mexican democracy has provided bodies and institutions that allow peaceful interaction between government and citizens, however, could be refined further. The constitutional engineering problems in Mexico are presented in the electoral instruments that have increased levels of governance and have led to the lack of legislative agreements. This problem arose with alternating and rational voter has encouraged not give all votes for the same party. The Mexican political system was designed for the hegemony of the PRI in power. The dilemma now is whether the PRI now return to the presidency will act with the old methods, or emerge a new political class in power. This will be the subject of analysis for another time. The obvious question: will the old politicians of the PRI regime or will a new group near Enrique Peña Nieto. The result was a combination of old PRI technocrats with politicians.

Robert Dahl [8] democracy ensures that a State prospers and develops more than any other system. The truth is that democracy is tied to the free market economy and this can create a dilemma about which economic model is more effective. In Mexico at least since the 1980s, the welfare model was replaced by a commercial opening (neoliberal), which remains in force until now.

One of the achievements of this model has been controlling inflation and reducing public debt. The latest economic crisis of great magnitude was December 1994, from that time; the Mexican political system has enjoyed economic stability. The presidential administrations of Ernesto Zedillo, Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon have left the economy with healthy finances and apparently the model does not change much with the president Enrique Peña Nieto

### 2.2. Direct Democracy and Representative Democracy

Democracy rests on the pillar of political representation. This enables interaction and regulates peaceful pursuit of power through elections. The most significant actors are political parties, which the diversity of structure, ideology and platform options offered to citizens to elect the government. From the conceptual framework the greater institutionalization [32] the greater the stability of the game and this will generate a cohesive dominant coalition that favors the persistence of democracy. The three strong parties, PAN, PRI and PRD have a different institutionalization, the most established is the PRI, followed by the PAN and PRD

finally conflicts that characterize it.

Since democracy arrived to Mexico in 1997, the PRD has led to strengthening citizen participation mechanisms. They passed a law that allows integrating participation of the population claims to the Legislative Assembly. At the federal level these mechanisms are in a regulatory lag, at least in practice. This item on the agenda of government reform must be addressed by the next president of the Republic, during the period 2012-2018. The Federal District has been since 1997 a key position to the left. This position has won four consecutive elections (Cardenas, 1997, Lopez Obrador-2000, Marcelo Ebrard, 2006 and Miguel Angel Mancera, 2012).

For Maurice Duverger [11] contemporary democracy cannot be exercised without the assumption of sovereignty and cede authority to a legal actor or an institution that embodies the popular will. In the electoral game involved the following stakeholders: citizens, candidates, political parties, representatives in the fields Legislative, Judicial and Executive, among others. The route of the competition for power requires the interaction and interdependence of all actors. Democracy in a political system provides the ability to compete for power equally, although in practice some players possess more resources to get it [6].

The paper is important to distinguish between direct and representative democracy. The first refers to a theoretical state-idealistic, must be of political equality and the rule of complete and full participation of citizens in public decisions. However, as idealistic is not operating on a large scale in a political system [8]. Given this difficulty becomes relevant representative democracy.

Giovanni Sartori [35] argues that representative democracy established political and electoral mechanisms to elect a certain number of people; the route is a constitutional engineering majority or proportional representation. Representatives acting on behalf of the citizen. They actively participate in the spaces for political discussion. They are entitled to exercise and decide on behalf of the people (citizens), and defend the general welfare. The authority is transferred through voting in elections.

The anterior aspect itself has been transformed, the Mexican regime has perfected over the distribution of power tools, especially in the electoral field. To include minorities, expanded the system of proportional representation and also added the principle of minority in the Senate, which expanded the party system. In addition to this voting threshold 2% is still low to maintain legal registration of the parties, which is lower in countries like Germany, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Chile to establish thresholds of 5%.

Whether or representative democracy, direct inclusion mechanisms, there are criticisms of the effectiveness of the representatives, however so far the first is the best tool to channel the demands of citizens towards the government. The participation in public affairs is the basic premise of democracy and it was studied in the classical texts of as Madison and Hamilton [17] among others. To achieve a more effective democracy in social terms, should move beyond the improvement and understanding between political actors and

involve citizens in public decisions, which is achieved by integrating a deliberative democracy.

Representative democracy is the most successful within the political system, however also assumes reviews, not perfect, nor will ever be, for example, the decision is for most, not all, that is, in the game election is needed most agree, but by no means includes the 100 percent it is. This of course throws an elected president, but the difficulty is that it also generates little legitimacy (acceptance) when the result is between the winning candidate and the second is very small. In democracy there are three rules in representative democracy:

Most simple: It is the mechanism that allows a winner because it gets more votes than the other competitors, for example:

Party A wins with 36 percent of the votes 35.9

Party B gets the votes

Party C gets 28.1 percent of the votes

The difference between the winner, second and third place is very small, but the simple majority rule works because you get a winner, however, this is not the winner get high legitimacy (acceptance). First place won with 36 percent of 100, leaving there 64 percent of discontent among those who did not vote for option A.

In the 2000 presidential elections the winning candidate Vicente Fox was the undisputed with 42.52%, the second place was far from the winner, with 36.10%, but still, a significant percentage of voters are dissatisfied. In 2006, the scenario was different; the margin of victory between the winner and second place was minimal. Felipe Calderon won with 35.89% of the votes for Lopez Obrador, who obtained 35.31%, sparking the loser used the discourse of electoral fraud.

The really important thing is that the simple majority rule generates a winner, even if it for a single vote difference. If this happens the result must be respected. For the election of July 1, 2012, the result was more extensive than in 2006, yet again the losing candidates not accept the results issued by the Federal Electoral Institute. The result of Preliminary Electoral Results Program was 38.5% for Peña Nieto, and 31.26% for Lopez Obrador, a difference of 7 percentage points.

Absolute majority: 50% of the votes + 1. The majority mechanism is more competitive than before, as it requires winning half + one. It is harder to get, which partly solves the lack of social legitimacy, however there is still a 49% disagreement. This system generates more electoral competitiveness, and automatic offers more legitimacy. Not the same win an election with 37% of the votes to win more than half + 1.

This dilemma is not a minor issue in the Mexican political system, instead if implemented in the presidential election could move into the runoff mechanism. Only the second round would the two candidates who received the most votes, which is intended that the winner of the second round gets more than 50 + 1 of the votes, therefore, achieves greater acceptance and sympathy from the electorate.

Qualified majority: 66% of the vote (2/3 of the total). It is the highest legitimacy mechanism in democracy; it requires that March 2 agree. This rule requires negotiation and political consensus, especially if applied to a Congress. In some political systems like Mexico, for constitutional reforms required supermajority. Although there is still a 34% disagreement, is the instrument to make decisions in a consensual manner. This mechanism would be difficult to implement at the presidential level, but it is very useful when your guidance for passing laws and initiatives. This rule bordered to the party of President Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderon will try to negotiate with the majority party, they could not approve structural reforms itself. In order to change the constitution needed at least 334 deputies, bleak scenario when in 2000 won 208 seats in the Legislature of 2003, were 151, in the 2006 election won 206, while in the midterm election of 2009 dropped to 143 deputies.

The mechanism is effective because it forces the parties to negotiate both the ruling party and the majority in Congress, especially if it is a party opposed to President. This problem is accentuated when the Chief Executive does not develop the ability to negotiate. In that case the government divides power rather than share it. In the first case, the government does not exchange with the opposition incentives, so the reforms are pending. In the second case, power sharing arrangement assumes the governance generate and exchange requests between the two powers.

The rules of democracy are not perfect, in all cases the result is dissatisfaction, but the game is so democratic, electoral justice is based on the decision of the majority of participants. John Stuart Mill [38] called this weakness of democracy as the tyranny of the majority. Understandably Mill classic posture, but if not representative democracy, then how to include everyone in decision making. The rules allow more institutional interaction to negotiate, although one must not lose sight, that to achieve agreements are also informal arrangements otherwise pass reform, etc.

### 2.3. Democracy and Political Institutions

A first element necessary for the functioning of a democracy is that political institutions exist. These should be deregulated, independent and impartial. It also requires that promote political pluralism and the constitutional protection of political behavior. A classic work great implications in the creation of institutions was the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison and Jay [17] which establishes their origin, function and relevance in a political system. For detailed how institutions inside and its impact on the constitutional regime classic work of Karl Deutsch [10] is relevant and necessary. Political institutions in Mexico have become relevant, at least, since 1996 to date. The reform of that year, allowed major changes, not only in the electoral law, but on the impact of existing institutions and creating new ones. Full independence was achieved by excluding IFE interior minister as the highest authority of the institute, created the Court of the Judiciary of the Federation (Electoral Tribunal) as a last resort in electoral qualification, notwithstanding the

above, there are outstanding have outpaced existing institutions such as the permanence of the dirty war in the electoral process. In the election of 2006 was used the most to weaken the leftist candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, on the other hand in the election process of 2012, was again used to weaken, the PRI candidate first and then to the PRD.

The IFE and the Electoral Tribunal were exceeded in the quality of electoral competition. The paper is clear that the organization of the election is timely and smoothly, but the atmosphere of confrontation, manipulation of images and speeches were not detained by both institutions.

A political system with weak institutions are more prone to the development of authoritarianism, a military dictatorship or a regime as it was for decades the dominant party system in Mexico. The large-scale institutions are not only useful but necessary to maintain the status quo, whether to an undemocratic regime or one in the process of consolidation. Institutions in Mexico are strong to avoid the temptation to return to authoritarianism, but have the weakness to allow the existence of family and corporate parties in the first instance with the Green Party of Mexico and in the background with the New Party Alliance.

The weakness of political institutions is a task ahead of the new democracies. The external enemy-socialism-is no longer a danger, the risk manifests inside the political system itself. This fragility is accentuated social polarization, which is solved with strong institutions that promote social cohesion and administration. Corporatism in Mexico remains in force, in which union leaders align the party that offers better performance, for example, the union of PEMEX, the SNTE, the union of the STC Metro in Mexico City, even leaders like Alejandra Barrios for traders in the nation's capital.

Institutions regulate behavior, economics, political values and social order. They are indispensable for the development and promotion of citizens, in the sociological sense enable social mobility. Institutions may also have certain weaknesses, which are take advantage of corporate structures, whether union or groups who support the ruling party.

### 2.4. Elections

A democratic system requires as an essential mechanism to hold elections, but not necessarily the implementation of this process ensures that a regime is democratic. Mexico is a clear example of this exception. During the period 1936 to 2000 had been met recurrent presidential elections and newspapers, although these did not allow de facto political alternation in the executive branch. These issues were addressed with precision in the work of Pablo González Casanova [16] about the formation of political power in Mexico. The holding of elections was not reason enough to label Mexico as a democracy.

In 1989 in Mexico was inaugurated a new phase of political competition. The system was open and the plurality gradually started from the municipalities, governorships step was followed by Congress and allowed the change in the presidency in the historic elections of July 2, 2000. This was

defined as a gradualist transition (reform of the political system) and Mauricio Merino called this transition process and voted. Just changed the government, but the political system remained the same.

Therefore, the elections are important for strengthening democracy. There can be no democracy without elections, direct (Mexico-vote case of free, universal) or indirect (for the United States of America-by-state electoral votes). Note that from an instrumental standpoint, democracy arrived in 1997 the Mexican political system works, but from the point of view of constitutional engineering, the alternation is not enough, there must be governance and dialogue.

Petra Bendel [4] states that elections must be secured and jurisdictionally validated by an institution to act as an effective counterbalance to the rights and obligations of the parties. At the same time they must establish procedures to challenge the election results. In Mexico there are three institutions that fulfill these functions: the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which organizes the federal elections of deputies, senators and President, the Electoral Tribunal of the Judiciary of the Federation (Electoral Tribunal), which applies resolutions final and incontestable and finally the Federal Institute for Access to Information (IFAI), dependence seeking transparency and accountability in the public exercise. These institutions must be expanded powers, especially to meet as real balances and generate a more effective balance to the parties. In some cases, the IFE and the IFAI can only make recommendations and sanctions. Independence is not enough, you must implement an accounting more transparent and equitable.

### **3. The Constitutional Re-engineering: The Necessary Changes**

Espinoza and Meyenberg [14] and Navarrete [31] argue that the party system in Mexico is characterized by a concentration on three strong parties (PRI, PAN and PRD). These coalesce most state governments, local congresses and most municipal governments across the country. The existence of three strong parties does not mean there are not others who compete in the political arena, however, they are crucial when building electoral alliances.

What is the problem of small parties. These usually have a percentage of sympathy between 2 and 5% of the vote. The parties to these features are: Mexico Green Party, Labour Party, Citizens Movement (formerly Convergence for Democracy), New Alliance. They mostly come together with a big party and participate in electoral alliances, however after the campaign become legislative alliances. The case of the New Alliance Party is interesting, was nominated Gabriel Cuadri, an academic with a successful career in the private sector. No question he stopped representing Elba Esther Gordillo and SNTE union. Despite the above, the voters rewarded with maintaining the registration of the game. In the election of 2012 was the only news regarding the candidates.

The following section lists outstanding issues of state reform. The paper is important to note that these issues have been present in academic discussions since the arrival of the alternation, however have not had the expected impact on political parties. No wonder that the theory does not match reality partisan.

#### **3.1. Reduce Funding**

Political parties in Mexico receive public funding year after year, with this made ordinary activities and campaigns. Although there are mechanisms for resource control, the expenses are excessive media. This resulted in 2007 that limited electoral reform electoral participation only to political parties and left out to third parties (employers) to spread propaganda for or against candidates. To Santana [33], the main criticism of the strict regulation is limiting public opinion and affects group processes and individual preferences. Although the regulation of campaign stops, parties manage to spend more than necessary to sample the 2012 election, in which he documented that gave PRI cards Soriana department store with lots of 300, 500 and 700 pesos, were delivered about one million 700 thousand cards. Now not only is questioning the PRI candidate, also questioned the Movement Morena, which formed a parallel structure to the PRD for the presidential campaign of López Obrador. In the case of PAN with Josefina Vazquez Mota is mentioned who had infiltrated the federal government resources. In all cases, it appears that the electoral law was exceeded its powers of regulation and punishment of the election campaign. For a thorough analysis on the effects of media exposure expenditures and see the work of IFES [2].

Aparicio [1] and Mena [28] spots spending, propaganda and electoral marketing during the [pre and campaign] have been very costly for the state, so citizens demand the reduction of privileges to the games. Throughout the election campaign were broadcast about 44 million spots of the presidential candidates, which makes democracy very expensive and excessive media exposure for citizens. Of course it is a very lucrative business for television. The most sensitive issue was the lack of fairness in the election, in fact, the first requirement Yosoy132 movement was that the company assumed a posture Televisa biased in favor of the PRI candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto. The same speech was used by Lopez Obrador in most of the campaign.

#### **3.2. Reduce Effective System of Parties**

This is a proposal that tries to facilitate governance in Congress. Remembering Duverger laws, among fewer political parties more likely to reach agreement on legislative spaces. This is achieved because the seats are allocated to fewer games, and the possibility of dialogue is strengthened. According to Espinoza and Meyenberg [14] in Mexico there is a system of moderate pluralism-exclusive, three parties that are emerging as winner's election after election. In the competition involved more games but the traditional political culture conducive Mexican voter to be three and not more

matches is really important. The competition throws an alternation between the three parties in all areas of government, but hardly strong party consolidates quarter. In some elections, the ruling party is the PRI, while the second place is the PAN, however in other processes, the second change to the PRD. Actually have formed three blocks of practice: PRD / PT / MC, PRI / PVEM and PAN. These three blocks compete together in most electoral processes, therefore the proposal to reduce the number of parties is justified in order to build an electoral system that favors the majority.

This initiative proposed for example increase to 4% of the vote to keep the registry, the current is 2%. Other suggestions prefer "reducing the number of federal legislators." [15]. These reforms would eliminate the parties who have no political weight and achieve majorities in big games. Reducing the number of games would work because it would eliminate some spaces of proportional representation, which polarize public decisions.

If you increase the minimum to maintain registration with the IFE, insignificant parties would risk losing their legal status. They only survive because they compete in electoral alliances with larger parties. This happened even before the election of 2012, the year in which the parties had to maintain your registry by yourself and not in partnership. The novelty was postulated common candidate and the voter could vote for parties that applied the same candidate.

Following the scheme of Sartori [34] and satellite parties could not subsist by themselves and the seats are awarded by proportional representation would be divided between the three strong parties and strengthen the party's president. The other possibility would completely eliminate proportional representation. Topic that requires an article in itself to defend or criticize the proposal.

Small parties survive in the Mexican political system because from 1994 have repeatedly participated in electoral alliances with the major parties, so that the alliance no problem covering guaranteed minimum percentage to maintain their registration with the IFE. This is a weakness because it not only moves the percentage to cover the voting threshold, but also a certain amount of seats in the Congress. This relationship is best for small parties to large. This logic as explained above, changed for the 2012 federal election.

### 3.3. Revocation of Mandate

This proposal would consolidate the legitimacy of the President. Currently it is not politically responsible to Congress, but with a constitutional reform of this nature could strengthen accountability and increase the effectiveness of the government structure of the executive branch. Notes that the recall election half of the presidential term could revitalize the performance of the president because he may be punished by the voters. If the Chief Executive will continue to rule aims to exert efficient and effective administration, otherwise you will lose the job. Now, there are political risks that opposition parties could use. The opposition could play for the president fails agreements and

be punished by the voters, so follow pending governance.

Another proposal to increase the legitimacy of the next president is a runoff election. If we recall the case of the 2006 presidential election, the winning candidate of the PAN, Felipe Calderon defeated PRD less than one percentage point, which led to the new president will arrive with little social legitimacy. The second round would force the two parties with the most votes in the first election to compete again and achieving undisputed victor. This will generate greater acceptance, identification of citizens with the new president and a substantial increase in sympathy with the general population. However, the problem of governance continues pending. The benefits and risks of the second round in all levels of government (municipal, state and federal).

### 3.4. Presidential Reelection

This proposal is also included in the so-called Reform. He has thought about the duration of the mandate and relevance than as part of the constitutional practices of the political system. Despite several attempts no progress between political parties, and nationalist resistance to the political class that defends the argument of the Mexican Revolution: cash suffrage election. For a thorough review of this issue, see the classic work of Camargo [7] and a current reflection Dworak [13].

Another proposal that was recently inserted in the full Senate Chamber is the ability to think in a coalition government (2011). In conducting a review of the state of affairs on divided government, found that sufficient evidence exists to support the proposed academic. The justification of a coalition government arises when the President is limited because his party holds the majority in Congress, therefore generating a divided government scenario.

From the perspective of two engines of Giovanni Sartori, the first possibility is to build a shared government, instead of legislative intransigence president's party, power is distributed by lease (approve) initiatives of the opposition parties and they support the president in others. In the first instance the negotiation and skill can overcome the limitations of the minority party in Congress.

Another alternative is to build a coalition government that allows a kind of semi-presidentialism in terms of Giovanni Sartori [35]. The basic assumption is that the government can operate with two motors. One can choose the president when it reaches the majority in Congress is under no obligation to negotiate in advance with the opposition parties because the party itself won a majority. The other engine work when the president does not obtain the required legislative and collaboration, in this case the President pact [constitutionally] with the opposition parties and themes initiatives to be supported in both houses (deputies and senators). In exchange for support for the president, the parties involved in the nomination and approval of the president's cabinet secretaries. The coalition government in other words is a shared government with legal scope and not just political. For a more detailed feature of coalition governments see Mayhew [26]. Shuggart and Carey [37], Laver and Shepsle [20],

Austen and Banks [3], Mainwaring and Shuggart [25], Lanzaro [19], among others.

#### 4. Conclusions

Democracy in Mexico is relatively recent. Although regular elections were held every six years, there were no conditions to be considered really a democracy. For decades, there were a series of electoral reforms that allowed a gradual and controlled opening, which finally allowed the transition in 2000.

The Mexican political system has a number of attributes that place it as a democracy in every sense of the word as rated by Juan Linz [22]. The alternation occurs at all levels of government, from municipalities, state governments, local and federal Congress and the presidency of the Republic.

From the political transition has created new challenges and now we discuss the relevance to renew or change the constitutional system to promote good governance, which has been hindered by divided government. These changes have been widely known as the Reform. Although there is a strong need to overcome the limitations of the current Constitution sheds, political parties (three games strong: PRI, PAN and PRD) have been unwilling to support them.

Democracy in Mexico runs the risk of holding political alternation in the presidency, but with presidential candidates who are not able to win a majority in Congress, which condemns them for three to six years to a recurrent confrontation with the opposition parties. The solution is to encourage new mechanisms for reengineering procedures allocation of seats, reducing the party system or ultimately a coalition government. The PRI party in government with President Enrique Peña Nieto, has managed initially with Mexico Pact, share power rather than divide. To analyze the long-term effects of the agreement, will be the subject of analysis for the following years.

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